We consider the intertemporal social optimization problem of minimizing the present value of the costs incurred from both disease and treatment. Though the analysis is complicated by the analytical failure of concavity, we are able to substantially characterize both the long run equilibria and the adjustment paths. The cost minimizing program is shown to exhibit decreased levels of treatment at higher disease levels. The socially optimal program is compared to individually rational behavior and the inefficiencies in private behavior from the infection externality are shown to cause increases in the equilibrium rate of infection.
Introduction to Economics Of Medical Treatment In The SIS Infectious Disease Model
This paper analyzes the problem of minimizing the cost of disease through medical treatment. This is a topic of current interest because of the emergence, and reemergence, of a number of infectious diseases. The authors are not aware of any general analysis of this problem, even though it is an important one in this period of reductions in public health funding. This introductory analysis is based on one of the simplest models of infectious disease, the SIS model, but the main features of the results will apply to more general models. Sanders (1971) and Sethi (1974) are previous analyses of optimal treatment in the SIS model which appear in the biomedical literature. However, they only consider the social cost problem with linear marginal costs of medical treatment. In those works, there is some critical rate of infection below which it is optimal to treat fully and above which treatment is set to zero. This paper extends that work in the following ways:
1. The analysis is done for general cost functions of treatment and the dynamic adjustment paths are described and analyzed, 2. A more general version of the above mentioned critical rate of infection is derived where the economically optimal level of treatment is shown to be negatively related to the extent of infection, 3. Individually rational behavior is described and shown to exhibit lower treatment levels than would be socially optimal.
There are several more recent papers on the economics of infectious disease, such as Fine and Clarkson (1986) , Brito, Sheshinski and Intriligator (1991) , Geoffard and Philipson (1992) , and Posner (1993, 1994) ; but they are primarily concerned with prevention.
The SIS Infectious Disease Model With Medical Treatment
The SIS model describes diseases in which both recovery and re-infection are able to occur. Introductions can be found in Bailey (1975) , and Hethcote (1976) . The model is most often used for bacterial or parasitic infections for which there is no permanent immunity. There are two states in the model: the susceptible state, S, and the infectious state I. The letters S and I will be used to denote both the state and a measure of the number of individuals in that state. A person in state S is healthy, but susceptible to infection upon exposure to an infected individual. Upon infection the person enters the infected state I, and is assumed to be infectious to susceptibles until recovery. No superinfection is assumed to occur, so infecteds are not affected by exposure to other infected individuals. There is a constant probability rate of recovery over time. After recovery the infected person returns to the susceptible state. The initials SIS refer to the movement of a typical individual through these two states: Susceptible -> Infected -> Susceptible.
Treatment is modelled as a flow good and its effect is independent of the duration of treatment. Treatment also has no preventive properties either during or after recovery from infection, so only infecteds will purchase it. The model is essentially a continuous time version of a discrete Markov model. In a discrete time setting, the interpretation is that during each period the infected individual can purchase and consume either exactly one or zero units of medical treatment that increases the probability of recovery during that period, but does not effect the probability of recovery in any subsequent period. The number of individuals treated is denoted by M(t).
The model is in continuous time and the individuals are modeled as a continuum of immortal representative agents. The large number approximation will be assumed to hold, so a deterministic model will be used to represent the probabilities of state transitions. The SIS model with stationary population, normalized w.l.o.g. to unity, consists of the following equations:
Equations (1) and (2) can be eliminated, with S replaced by (1 − I). So this becomes:
β is the transmission coefficient of the disease, and λ is the spontaneous rate of recovery for an untreated infected person and δ is the rate of recovery with treatment (treatment is assumed effective, hence δ > λ). The force of infection is the product of β and I; this gives the instantaneous probability rate of infection for a typical susceptible individual. The formulation assumes that the mass action principle of contagion holds. This assumption is appropriate when the spread of the disease does not require direct contact, but can be spread through contaminated clothing or food, or respiration from infected people who mix homogeneously among susceptibles. An economic implication of this assumption is that modification of individual behavior is not a reliable means of protection against exposure. It is assumed that no effective preventive measures exist. The use of a representative agent model with the assumption of homogenous mixing implies that this analysis is appropriate for a relatively small area. A densely populated farming region, a suburban town or an inner city area (such as the South Bronx in New York, or the Tenderloin in San Francisco) would be typical applications.
Special Cases
1. Where treatment is excluded, i.e. M ≡ 0, equation (4) has two possible sets of equilibria. If λ/β < 1, then there are two equilibria. One is an unstable equilibria with no infection where S * = 1 and I * = 0. The other is stable equilibrium with S * = λ/β and I * = 1−S * . If λ/β > 1 then the no infection equilibrium is unique and stable.
2. Where maximum treatment is the rule, i.e. M(t) = I(t) then the model reduces to dI(t)/dt = βI(t)(1 − I(t)) − δI(t). Analysis of epidemiological equilibria parallels that in the model without treatment. If δ/β < 1 then there is a stable endemic full treatment equilibrium, and an unstable trivial one with no disease. The stable equilibrium is given by S * = δ/β, I * = 1 − (δ/β). If δ/β > 1 then the no disease equilibrium is unique and stable, and then full treatment will eliminate the infection. For 0 < M(t) < I(t), the stationary combinations of M and I are found be solving the quadratic equation βI(1 − I) − λI − (δ − λ)(I − M) = 0 for admissible values of M and I.
The Nature of Costs
Infection imposes a constant per period economic cost of Cd per infected per period, which includes the value of lost labor income and leisure, or pain and discomfort. The cost of treatment is C(M (t)), where this is interpreted as to-tal social cost of treatment and is assumed to exhibit increasing marginal cost. These costs include materials, facilities, and labor used in administering treatment. It also includes the resources (including time) used by the patient and the value of inconvenience and discomfort in undergoing treatment. The rationale for increasing marginal costs stems both from short run inflexibilities and the Le Chatelier Principle as well as any inherent diseconomies which may persist in the long run. Even though our analysis provides for an infinite time horizon to avoid the arbitrariness of end-point specifications, our concerns are, in essence, relatively immediate.
Within any reasonable time frame, some facilities and personnel in both production and the delivery of treatment will be inflexible or fixed. It is assumed that the infection spreads very quickly compared to the time it would normally take to expand medical facilities. This assumption of some fixed capacities with the natural application to a small area implies that congestion costs (which depend of the number of people purchasing treatment per unit of time) may be important.
Several functional forms for C(M(t)) will be analyzed. The simplest is a constant marginal flow cost of treatment: C(M) = αM(t). This would be appropriate for the case in which there are no congestion costs -a situation in which the disease was easy to diagnose and evaluate -and treatment consisted solely of taking a common medication. Indeed, this is exactly the formulation studied by Sanders (1971) and described below in 2.2.1.
The case of increasing costs in the form of a quadratic relationship is also considered: C(M(t)) = .5M(t)
2 . This applies when there are some congestion costs as the number of people treated per unit of time increases and would be appropriate for a disease which was expensive and time consuming to diagnose, evaluate and treat. Tuberculosis in third world countries or some US inner city areas would an example. Two other assumptions will be considered as well. One is the case of decreasing marginal costs. This would be appropriate when there are set-up costs independent of the number of people being treated per period coupled with constant marginal costs for treatment. An example would be a disease where the disease is easy to evaluate and patient behavior is an important element of treatment. Then medical intervention would consist of group instructional classes coupled with short examinations and distribution of medicine. Costs would also include patient activities, such as special procedures for washing clothes and bedding. Body lice would be a plausible example. Another example would be costs of storing and testing medicine, say a refrigeration and monitoring system for temperature sensitive drugs.
Finally, U-shaped marginal costs are considered, where there are both set-up and congestion costs.
The structural nature of the treatment "industry" is a potential source of concern and is a basis for study in itself. Decreasing marginal costs may lead to a natural monopoly while increasing marginal costs could result in a veritable continuum of firms. We will simply assume that treatment is supplied according to its marginal cost of production as reflected by C 0 (M). In modelling decentralized behavior, expectations are taken to be fully rational with individuals correctly predicting the entire future time path of the level and probability of infection in the population and adjusting their own behavior accordingly.
Conclusions
Regardless of the cost structure chosen, the optimal program exhibits a generalization of the negative relationship observed from Sanders (1971) between the number treated and the number infected. The intuition for this result is appears as a consequence of the increased likelihood of reinfection in the presence of a larger infected proportion of the population, ceteris paribus reducing the benefits derived from treatment. Since along an optimal path, marginal cost must equal marginal benefit, the lower marginal benefit is, the lower must be the corresponding level of marginal cost.
The statement of the optimization problem.
Our problem then is to minimize the total discounted cost of disease -both direct and from treatment -over the indefinite future. We shall initially deal with the finite period version of this problem and then examine the limit of these programs as T becomes arbitrarily large.
The Maximum Principle

1
Choose M(t), for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , to minimize the objective function:
where ρ is the rate of time preference, subject to the continuous time version of the infection equation:
The spot value of the Hamiltonian expression for the intertemporal optimization problem can then be written
where the spot shadow cost of another infected individual, ϕ, changes according to:
and M is chosen to minimize H so
With increasing marginal cost, M is an increasing function in ϕ. Finally, since I(T ) cannot reach zero in finite time, the transversality condition may be written ϕ(T ) = 0.
The interpretation of ϕ.
Along the optimal path, the costate variable ϕ(t) -the spot cost of another infected -equals the addition to the minimum present value of costs from t onward of another infected at time t. Minimizing the Hamiltonian w.r.t. M then trades off the instantaneous cost of treatment against the reduction in the rate of change of infection that results. For an interior solution, this dictates that the marginal cost of treatment be equal to the marginal cost of infection, ϕ, multiplied by (δ − λ), i.e. the reduction in the rate of change of infection due to the additional treatment.
An informal walk through the dynamics of the Phase Space
We shall characterize the Phase Space by its major structures -here the = 0. The model may be degenerate for particular parameter values and some, or even all, of these intersections may fail to occur. For our exposition here, we shall concentrate on the cases with the richest set of equilibria. . For combinations of (I, ϕ) above this locus, ϕ is rising while below, it declines. The
∂I(t) ∂t
= 0 locus has the form of an inverted parabola with I increasing below and decreasing above. There is, however, one modification which arises from the limitation that the number treated M cannot exceed the number infected, I. Thus for high values of the shadow price, ϕ,
becomes simply βI(t)(1 − I(t)) − δI(t) so that when the total population of infected individuals is treated, I simply moves in the direction of max{0, 
5. the unstable steady state ((b) in figure 2.1): the smallest positive root to
The Stationary Loci
A necessary condition 4 that there be interior stationary solutions is β − λ > 0 (or that the reproductive number R = (β/λ) > 1) in which event there are as many as three stationary points in the phase space in addition to (0, 0). An interior solution can only exist if the untreated disease can establish itself in an endemic equilibrium.
1. A stationary point of type a exists if the ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 locus intersects the vertical line at I = β−δ β at a value of ϕ larger than λ + ρ − β + 2β max{0, β−δ β }(as in figure 2 .1). Otherwise stated:
The ( = 0 loci), while the second (b) is described by an explosive and possibly cyclic point at a lower infection rate.
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The characterization of the optimal solution can now be described in terms of behavior w.r.t. these stationary points.
7
The limiting response of the optimal path as T → ∞ is described by the stable branches to the saddle points at (a) and (c), i.e. the two spiral arms emanating from (b) outward to (a) and beyond and (c) and beyond. For any initial I, choosing ϕ(0) to place oneself along this locus would lead toward one of the saddle points. However, where the paths are spirals, only those portions of the paths between 5 The point a could occur on the vertical axis if β−δ β ≤ 0. 6 At both of the associated equilibrium levels of infection, a reduction in the rate is achieveable through additional treatment. At (b) such a reduction would also be accompanied by a lower long run rate of treatment as well, while at (c) it would require a higher long run rate of treatment indefinitely. Optimality, of course, requires balancing these gains and costs.
7 Since the optimization problem is not concave, the usual uniqueness and sufficiency characteristics of the transversality conditions fail and comparisons must be made along all paths satisfying the necessary (or first order) conditions. the saddle points and the ∂I(t) ∂t = 0 locus need be considered since it can never be optimal to choose an initial value for ϕ(0) such that the trajectory returns to the same value of I at a later time (see the solid paths in figure 2. 2).
Figure 2.2:
The remaining overlap between these two paths cannot be resolved without direct computation -a consequence of the non-convexity in the problem itself. In the event that the rightward path does not extend fully to I = 0, there will be a discontinuity in the relationship between I(0) and the optimal starting value for ϕ(0). There will be a single switching point (as we increase the starting value for I) where we "jump" from the leftward to the rightward moving path. 8 If the valuations are the same along the two paths for any two distinct values of I then, at intermediate I's, the valuations must also be the same. If this were not true, then it would be possible to start at a point on the lower valuation path, to then move along that path until the future valuations were equal and then jump to the other path and move in the reverse direction Consequently, there is a negative monotone relationship between the level of infection and the optimal number of individuals treated -either of the two paths separately and even if there is a jump from the left path (i.e. the one through (a)) to the right one (through (c)). This somewhat surprising result is driven by the lowered value of treatment resulting from the increasing risk of reinfection as the number of infecteds in the population is increased.
Where there is substantial risk of severe disability or even death, C d has an exceptionally large value and the ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 locus (
∂ϕ(t) ∂t
= ϕρ − C d + ϕ(−β + 2βI + λ) = 0) described (with some abuse of notation) by ϕ(I) is sufficiently high so that only intersections of type a -the full treatment equilibria -appear. Accordingly, the optimal path (to the right of a) lies above the ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 locus and exhibits a high shadow cost of infection, reflected by a correspondingly high rate of treatment. The "temporary" nature of the benefits of cure become substantial and individuals treatment becomes the rule even at high treatment costs.
Other Structures for Treatment Costs
Constant Marginal Costs
The case analyzed by Sanders (1971) , where marginal costs are constant, say at MC, may be treated as a special case of the above analysis. The expression for . These vertical segments denote the full treatment and no treatment equilibria respectively. When the shadow value of treatment ϕ(t) exactly equals MC the level of treatment is indeterminate could be set so as to equate
with 0. The stability properties are as in the general case, with the intersection of the vertical segments and the ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 locus as saddle points and the intersection with the horizontal line as an unstable stationary state. As before, there are two sets of paths, one from each of the saddle points which constitute the possible solutions for optimal behavior. It is quite possible that an optimal program would until the original value of I was reached again, thereby creating a superior (i.e. lower cost) cycle violating the necessary conditions. initially treat and then cease treatment after the infection rate rose above some boundary. The turnpikes -or long run equilibria -would occur with either no or maximal treatment. What is significantly unique about this case is that treatment is generally either total or absent.
U-Shaped Average Costs
Our consideration here is principally with a program that incurs setup costs. The analysis is similar to that of the main presentation except that now treatment ceases entirely when its shadow value, ϕ(δ − λ), falls below the minimum of average cost, MAC. The phase space picture in figure 2.1 is altered to reflect a region of zero treatment where ϕ(δ − λ) < MAC. When ϕ attains this value, the level of treatment is at either zero or that associated with MAC. For values of ϕ above this level, the story is unaltered. The effect then is to split the phase space (see figure 2.4) horizontally at 
∂I(t) ∂t
may be maintained at 0 by "chattering", though in the depiction in figure 2 .4, ∂ϕ(t) ∂t would be negative and the system would quickly fall into the no-treatment state. 
Decreasing Marginal Costs
Where the marginal cost of treatment, C 0 (M ), is actually declining, then it is Hamiltonian minimizing to treat the entire infected group if 
On the Monotonicity of Treatment w.r.t. Infection
In each of these cases examined above, the negative monotonic relationship between numbers treated and infected persists. This robustness confirms that the source of this strategy of treatment results from the mass action model of contagion and not from the particular modelling of economics costs.
Individual Behavior
Individually Rational Behavior
Our model here corresponds to the notion of rational expectations. Individuals correctly predict the future path of the infection rate in the population and their optimizing behavior brings about this very path. However, they do not account for the impact of their behavior on the health of other susceptibles. Suppose first that the societal level of infection is perceived to follow some future path I(t). The individual, if infected, bears a cost C d and may choose treatment at some additional per period cost of P . In deciding whether or not to treat, the individual must look forward to the future probability of becoming reinfected. The higher that likelihood, the less valuable will be intervention. As before, the proposed treatment raises the rate of cure from λ to δ. The representative individual's problem may then be reduced to minimizing
where y(t) denotes the probability of being infected at time t, P (t) is the cost of treatment at time t, and ψ(t) is a control variable -(either 0 or 1) identifying whether the individual chooses treatment if infected at time t. The probability of infection evolves as:
where I(t) is the rate of infection in the population as a whole. The problem is, again, one in the calculus of variations. The spot Hamiltonian expression governing this minimization is then
where the future path of both I(t) and P (t) is presumed correctly known to the individual (i.e. perfect foresight). The control variable is chosen so as to minimize
If we are to have an internal solution where some proper fraction of the infected population elects treatment, then P (t) = ϕ(t)[δ − λ]. The shadow price ϕ(t) must evolve according to
But since P (t) = ϕ(t)[δ − λ] this can be rewritten as
Now in aggregate, the fraction of the population infected, I(t) must be equal to the probability of any individual being in the infected state, or y(t). Further, the number of individuals receiving treatment M (t) must equal ψ(t)y(t).
10 So, we have an equilibrium described by
3.
∂ϕ(t) ∂t
The phase space characterizing the necessary conditions for an optimum trajectory has the same general appearance as in the socially optimal case. The dynamics of infection are unchanged, only the perception of benefits differs depending on whether the impact upon others is recognized. Indeed, the ∂I(t) ∂t = 0 loci are identical but the ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 locus is now shifted downwards to
-the denominator has increased from ρ+2βI +λ−β by β(1−I(t)) . The stationary solutions now are roots to
and the rightmost saddle point is at a higher level of infection than in the socially optimal case as in Figure 3 .1 below.
A Non-marginal observation and the role of intervention
When, in the socially optimal model, the
∂I(t) ∂t
= 0 and ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 loci fail to intersect, the optimal path will ultimately involve full treatment. The individually = 0 locus could still present a right saddle point solution with a higher asymptotic level of infection. The difference is not merely the marginal shift from the higher locus but a global one from the absence of the right saddle point in the social model. In this event, there may be a major impact from the introduction of subsidies to modify individual behavior. In our example here, the only long run equilibrium in the individual case in figure 3 .1 is at (c 0 ) and there is no individual solution corresponding to (a) at all! Since paths (individual or social) will spend most of their time near the turnpikes, for some initial conditions (e.g. for initial I 0 s in the neighborhood of (a)) the social optimum will be near (a) while the individually rational equilibrium will be located near (c 0 ). Thus there can be a substantial divergence between individually rational behavior and the social optimum.
The difficulty lies in the individual's failure to recognize the higher risk which his or her own infection would impose on others. Standard solutions of the form of either subsidizing treatment or raising the cost of being infected (albeit a heartless approach) could serve to alter the individual incentives to correspond to the social costs.
Limitations and Extensions of the model
Heterogeneous Agents
There are several limitations to this analysis. The most important is the use of a representative agent model. As mentioned above, this limits the application of the model to relatively small, homogenous, areas. Models for more complex societies involving heterogeneous populations w.r.t. medical and/or economic characteristics will involve greater analytical complexity. For example, on the physical side we have assumed that all members of the population exhibit the same propensity for infection, recovery rate -with and without treatment -and contagion. On the economic side, we have supposed that all individuals incur the same cost of treatment whereas they might be expected to differ according to personal characteristics as well as distance from treatment centers, opportunity costs and the like.
Enhancing the analysis to encompass these extensions will, at the least, involve the creation of several linked SIS models with assumptions on mixing between the different populations. If the populations are so interconnected as to be inseparable, the dimensionality of the problem will be substantially increased with a correspondingly more involved level of mathematical complexity.
We have abstracted from the possibilities of prevention. Such prospects, while altering the equations are not likely to have an effect on the qualitative results. An externality between the social and private benefits of prevention (the latter failing to take into account the benefits of a reduced level of infection on the future infection risks to others) will still exist and the essential characteristic that a higher likelihood of reinfection lowers the benefits of treatment will still remain. There are several alternative means by which prevention could be introduced into the above model either by lowering the probability of infection (βI) for, or reducing the susceptible population (1 − I) by, "prevented" individuals. This would entail an additional social variable -the number of individuals treated, and an additional private variable -to treat or not. In the social case, treatment would occur until the social shadow price of infection was just matched by the marginal cost of treatment. In the individual case, the equilibrium number of treated would be determined so as to equate the private shadow price of infection with the marginal cost of treatment. Since the former is generally higher in the social case due to the inclusion of external effects, decentralization is likely to result in undertreatment.
In order to implement the model empirically, the precise underlying relationships need to be refined as to functional form and properties. These will, no doubt, vary with the nature of the disease being investigated as to the rate of spread of infection, magnitudes of cost and efficacy of treatments and prevention. . Now ∂ϕ(t) ∂t (or
∂M(t) ∂t
) is positive (or negative) as
so the ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 locus is described by:
When I = 1 this always yields a positive value for ϕ. As I is lowered the denominator falls and ϕ is higher rising asymptotically at I = β−ρ−λ 2β
. For still smaller values of I,
is always negative. Letting C 00 (M) = α, the steady states to ∂I(t) ∂t = 0 and ∂ϕ(t) ∂t = 0 must solve
The Finite Time Horizon
Since there is no constraint imposed on I(T ), then the optimal endpoint value for the adjoint variable along an optimal path, ϕ * (T ) = 0. As T becomes large, ϕ(0) must adjust so as to lengthen the time it takes the trajectory to reach the horizontal axis. Figure 5 .1 illustrates the backward paths from the I axis.In order to gain an understanding of the possible finite period optimal paths, consider all paths which terminate in finite time along the I axis. This may be accomplished by starting at points along that axis and running time backwards in the first order differential equations describing the motion in the phase space. Figure 5 .1 illustrates this family of backward paths. In this illustration we note three distinct type of trajectories depending upon the terminal value for I. For low values, the backward paths miss the (a) saddle point to the left, for intermediate values they lead back to the unstable equilibrium (b) and for still higher values they trace back toward the neighborhood of the saddle point at (c) to the right.
There are essentially four different stories (resulting from two possibilities in each of the following two cases) depending upon where the backward paths from the saddle points intersect the ∂I(t) ∂t = 0 locus. (see figure 5 .2 below for perhaps the most mathematically interesting). , 0} (point (d) in figure 2.1), the trajectory is monotone. The right backward path is always monotone and any initial ϕ(0) below these paths results in ϕ(t) reaching zero in finite time. For paths above, ϕ(t) cannot converge to 0; it may approach a stable limit cycle or may become arbitrarily large. Thus, the backward paths from the I axis will lie under the two branches of this path. These optimal programs "ride along" below, the stable branch of the saddle point only to, eventually, depart downwards for the horizontal axis. As the time lengthens, these paths bow in toward the saddle point (in whose neighborhood they move with nearly negligible speed). These paths exhaust the possible solutions.
2. Alternatively, if the left backward path from the rightmost saddle (c) passes to the right of (d) , then the (reverse) stable branch bends backwards where it crosses the ∂I(t) ∂t = 0 locus and spirals inward either toward (b) or to a stable limit cycle enclosing (b). Then for low initial values of I, paths which miss (a) on the low side may either proceed monotonically toward the I axis or even possibly spiral inward about (b) themselves. As time lengthens, these paths bow inward towards the turnpike at (a).
The branches to the two saddle points divide the space. Either one of the paths (both stable branches) misses the parabolic portion of the ∂I ∂t = 0 locus or they both "connect" at (b). This latter case where both of the backward arms spiral in about (b) is depicted in figure 5 .2. This division will aid in defining a region for the ϕ(0) where ϕ(T ) could reach 0.
Infinite Time Horizons
The choice of an infinite time horizon poses possible problems relating to existence of a solution. We shall instead suppose that there is a finite horizon, T , as above, then allow T to become arbitrarily large and examine the limiting path. Under the assumption that costs are quadratic, it is possible to show that any path which asymptotically approaches I = β−λ β without treatment is dominated and hence, cannot be optimal. These are precisely the paths for which the shadow price becomes negative in finite time. This result follows directly from the assumption that marginal cost goes to zero as the level of treatment is small, so it would always be cost effective to treat minimally.
As T → ∞ the optimal paths must take longer and longer to reach ϕ(T ) = 0. The way in which this can be accomplished from a given starting I(0) is to alter ϕ(0) so that the paths lie closer to the stable branches from the saddle points causing the trajectories to "bow inward" toward those saddle points (where they move slowly) in the manner of the usual turnpike theorems in growth theory. Therefore the limiting program must either coincide with a stable branch to a saddle point converging to either the rightmost equilibrium (type (c) )or else to the leftmost (type (a) ).
